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I. STATEMENT OF CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Statement of the Case 
The action underlying this appeal is a suit for legal malpractice. Attorneys at the 
Respondent law firm, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley (HTEH), represented and advised 
Appellant Walter Minnick in the preparation, revision, execution and recording of a conservation 
easement. The Conservation Easement Agreement conveyed a charitable gift to a not-for-profit 
land trust with considerable potential tax benefits to Mr. Minnick and his wife, the Appellants 
herein. The Agreement, as revised and approved by Respondents, contained express language 
warranting that "there are no outstanding mortgages . .. that have not been expressly 
subordinated to the Easement." Despite this warranty, HTEH negligently failed to assure that 
such a subordination occurred prior to recording the easement l . Because of this failure to 
subordinate, and for this sole reason, the United States Tax Court (Tax Court) disallowed the 
Appellants any charitable deduction on their income tax returns, resulting in taxes, interest and 
penalties of several hundred thousand dollars. 
This appeal arises from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the 
Respondents on statute of limitation grounds, pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 5-219(4). The 
trial court found that the malpractice action accrued more than two years before suit was filed, 
when Appellants first retained a tax attorney to represent them on an audit before the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). It reached this result despite clear, undisputed evidence that failure to 
subordinate (the basis of the malpractice claim) was never raised as a concern by the IRS and 
was not adopted by the Tax Court as the singular, dispositive reason for denying the charitable 
deduction until within the two year limitation period for filing the malpractice suit. 
I When the problem with the subordination surfaced four years later, the Respondent law firm did assist Appellants 
in obtaining and recording a subordination. But, as we discuss below, it was too late for Appellants to obtain a 
charitable tax deduction. 
At the time suit was filed and, indeed, at the time the District Court granted summary 
judgment, the Appellants were in the process of appealing the Tax Court decision. No tax 
liability had yet been assessed by the IRS for the Appellants' claimed tax deduction. 
Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that Appellants sustained "some damage" triggering the 
running of the statute of limitation when they first retained a tax attorney to represent them 
before the IRS on issues unrelated to subordination which did not implicate malpractice. Failure 
to subordinate was not raised as a potential concern by the IRS until almost a year later, and was 
not added by the IRS as a reason for disallowing the charitable deduction until five months 
before Appellants filed suit. 
The District Court disregarded the unequivocal fact that Appellants sustained no 
objectively ascetiainable damage (e.g. attorney fees) relating to the act or omission which forms 
the basis of the malpractice suit (e.g. failure to subordinate), until within two years of Appellants 
filing their malpractice suit. In the language of the precedent decisions of this Court, until there 
was objectively ascertainable, actual damages, which resulted from the Respondents' 
malpractice, and that could be recovered in a malpractice action, any suit Appellants might have 
filed earlier would have lacked proof of some damages and would have been subject to 
dismissal. 
Having granted summary judgment to the Respondents, the District Court then awarded 
them costs of $66.00 and attorney's fees of $50,000.00. Appellants argued below, and argue 
again on this appeal, that there was no "commercial transaction" within the meaning of Idaho 
Code, Section 12-120(3) warranting an attorney fee award. No "transaction" is identified as 
integral to Appellants' legal malpractice claim, and to the extent the Conservation Easement 
might be considered a "transaction," it was a "personal" gift, not "commercial." Nonetheless, 
2 
the District Court modified the proper legal standard and found that HTEH was hired "for a 
commercial purpose." Because Appellants were looking to eventually develop and sell the 
property affected by the Conservation Easement, the District Court held, the legal representation 
was "commercial in nature." 
Both the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney fees are assigned as error 
and are the subjects of this appeal. 
B. The Proceedings Below 
The Appellants tiled the instant action as a single cause of action for professional 
malpractice on June 7, 2012. (R. pp. 6-18) Respondents answered the Complaint on January 14, 
2013, raising eight affirmative defenses, including statute oflimitations. (R. pp. 19-27) The only 
discovery engaged in between the parties was the voluntary exchange of extensive documents 
and one set of written discovery requests from the Appellants. (R. pp. 509-517) No depositions 
were taken by either party. 
On August 16, 2013, Appellants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking 
dismissal of four of Respondents' defenses for estoppel, assumption of risk, statute of limitations 
and a contention the Tax Court would have denied the charitable deduction for other reasons, if 
not for lack of subordination. (R. pp. 266-67; 274-308) Respondents also filed a cross-motion 
for summary judgment based on the two year limitation ofIdaho Code, Section 5-219(4). (R. pp. 
28-29) 
Following the submission of briefs and supporting affidavits and documents, the District 
Court scheduled the cross-motions for hearing. (R. pp. 45-46) Appellants' submissions included 
an affidavit from their tax attorney, Tim Tarter, amplified by numerous documents explaining 
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the related IRS and Tax Court proceedings. (R. pp. 337-505) These show, among other things, 
that no question or concern whatsoever was raised by the IRS about mortgage subordination as a 
possible reason to disqualify the Appellants' claimed tax deduction until June 10, 2010, at the 
earliest2. 
The law firm's submissions included affidavits from the two attorneys primarily involved 
in Appellants' representation, Brian Ballard and Geoffrey Wardle. While the affidavits were 
submitted on summary judgment issues other than the statute of limitations question, the District 
Court nonetheless relied upon them in granting summary judgment and to an extent in awarding 
attorney fees. 
Hearing was held on summary judgment on October 2,2013. (R. pp. 45-46) On October 
28, 2013 the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, effectively dismissing the entire suit as barred by the statute of 
limitations. (R. pp. 719-729) It did not decide the Appellants' summary judgment motion as it 
related to other affirmative defenses. (R. p. 728) 
Respondents' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs was filed November 12, 
2013. (R. pp. 730-731) Appellants responded with their objections on November 25,2013, to 
which Respondents replied on December 6, 2013. (R. pp. 747-749) Following hearing on 
December 30, 2013, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision awarding the 
Respondents costs of $66.00 and fees of $50,000. (R. pp. 780-790) Appellants' Notice of 
Appeal on the summary judgment decision was filed December 5, 2013 (R. pp. 764-77), 
2 This is the date the IRS first sent a facsimile asking for "a copy of any and all subordination agreements." (R. pp. 
386) However, as is discussed below, failure to subordinate was not identified by the IRS as a reason to deny the 
charitable deduction until October 4, 2011 (R. pp. 416-421), and not pled as a ground for disallowance until January 
5,2012. (R. pp. 435-36) 
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followed by an Amended Notice of Appeal to incorporate the fees award on January 22, 2014. 
(R. pp. 793-96) 
C. Statement of Facts 
Inasmuch as this appeal arises from the grant of summary judgment, the pertinent facts 
are contained in the Complaint, corroborated and amplified by affidavits and further supported 
by numerous documents referenced in the affidavits. Accompanying this Brief is a Chronology 
of Events documented with references to the record which may be of assistance to this Court in 
understanding the protracted and somewhat complicated contextual history of the case. 
Before the District Court, the parties' briefings disagreed on several factual contentions, 
many of which are immaterial for the purpose of this appeal. (See R. pp. 660-663; 675-681) 
But, most notable and most material here is the scope of Respondents' legal representation. The 
District Court's summary of facts in its decision granting summary judgment is fairly accurate 
(R. pp. 719-722) although, as we discuss below, omits several facts important to the issues raised 
on appeal, most significantly found in the affidavits of Appellate Walter Minnick and 
Appellants' tax attorney Tim Tarter (Tarter). 
In the spring of 2004, Appellant Walter Minnick ("Minnick") had discussions with a 
neighbor who was interested in purchasing a significant portion of land Minnick owned in rural 
Ada County. (R. pp. 688; 693) Initially, Minnick engaged the services of Brian Ballard at the 
Respondent law firm on the purchase and sale agreement. (R. p. 654, ~ 4) However, in the 
course of ensuing discussions, in roughly June 2004, Minnick decided that rather than sell the 
land, he would develop it himself in what eventually became known as the Showy Phlox Estates 
(herein "Showy Phlox"). (ld.) 
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At the time, Minnick was aware the land he owned, as well as surrounding property, 
contained critical wildlife and plant habitat, wetland, watershed, riparian, natural scenery and 
other conservation values. (R. pp. 688; 693) Sometime in the fall or early winter of 2004, 
Minnick had informal conversations with the Open Space and Trail Coordinator with Ada 
County and people with the Land Trust for Treasure Valley ("Land Trust") about a conservation 
easement affecting his property to be granted to the Land Trust. (Id.; R. pp. 317-318, ~~ 9-10) 
The property comprising the Showy Phlox development was 73.81 acres in size, located 
off North Cartwright Road with frontage on Dry Creek, about one mile east of the Hidden 
Springs Subdivision. (R. pp. 8-9, ~ 16) Minnick's plan was to divide the property into seven 
single family residential housing lots, approximately ten acres each. (Id. ~ 15) A significant 
component of the project was a conservation easement restricting use and development on 
effectively 80% of the land. (Id. ~ 17; R. p. 524; Exh. X at 4, item 1) This easement was 
eventually donated to the Land Trust, a not-for-profit organization committed to conserving open 
space, habitat recreation and scenic values close to residential communities, and a qualified 
organization to receive charitable contributions satisfying Section 170(b )(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. (R. p. 316, ~ 3) 
When Minnick decided to pursue the Showy Phlox development, Ballard's involvement 
diminished and another attorney at HTEH, Geoff Wardle, took over and assumed responsibility 
for Appellants' legal needs, as they related to the Showy Phlox matter. (R. p. 654, ~ 4) The law 
firm and the client never entered into a written retainer agreement and there was no engagement 
letter describing or limiting the scope of legal services contemplated or intended by the parties. 
(R. p. 10, ~ 21-23; 499-500, ~~ 7 & 8) 
6 
In the underlying litigation, and in their submissions to the trial court on the cross 
motions for summary judgment, the parties disagreed considerably on the scope of the law firm's 
services, particularly as they pertain to the conservation easement. For example, Appellants 
contend that HTEH was aware from the inception of the firm's engagement that a significant 
feature of the proposed project would be a conservation easement granted to the Land Trust as a 
charitable gift. (R. pp. 9, , 17 & 19; 499, , 5) Respondent Wardle denies he was told by 
Minnick that he planned to claim the Conservation Easement as a tax deduction and never 
conceived of it as a gift. (R. pp. 650-51, , 6) From his perspective, Wardle merely reviewed the 
conservation easement to ensure it met local land use requirements. (Id.' 5) 
Nonetheless, on certain facts regarding the conservation easement there should be no 
dispute.3 At the request of Wardle, Minnick obtained a model conservation easement agreement 
from the Land Trust and gave it to Wardle. (R. pp. 10-11,,25; 500, , 10) The billing records of 
HTEH show Wardle was involved in reviewing, amending and revising numerous drafts of what 
evolved as the final Conservation Easement Agreement between February and September 2006. 
(R. pp. 580-583; HTEH 5644-5647) The Land Trust's attorney and Wardle prepared and 
reviewed as many as five drafts of the Agreement. (R. p. 500, , 12) All of the drafts, as well as 
the final version (R. pp. 534-542; Exh. Y at 7, , 11) prepared and recorded by Respondents, 
provided the following warranty: 
Grantor warrants that it owns the Property in fee simple and has 
conveyed it to no other person, and that there are no outstanding 
mortgages, tax liens, encumbrances, or other interests in the 
Property that have not been expressly subordinated to the 
Easement. Grantor further warrants that Grantee shall have the use 
of and enjoy all the benefits derived from and arising out of this 
Easement. (Emphasis added) 
3 To the extent these matters may be disputed in Respondents' Brief, they certainly may be assumed as true for the 
purpose of summary judgment. 
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The Internal Revenue Code authorizing tax deduction for "qualified conservation contributions" 
(generally, 26 CFR Section 1.170A-14), also required subordination, stating in Section 1.170A-
14(g)(2): 
No deduction will be permitted under this section for an interest in 
property which is subject to a mortgage unless the mortgage 
subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the qualified 
organization to enforce the conservation purpose of the gift in 
perpetui ty. 
At the time of the law firm's services, U.S. Bank had a mortgage on the Showy Phlox 
property. (R. pp. 544-551, Exhibit Z) Nonetheless, the Respondents never advised or discussed 
with Appellants the need to subordinate the mortgage to the Conservation Easement. (R. pp. 16, 
~ 57; 501, ~ 14) On September 7, 2006, Minnick was presented with a large number of 
agreements and instruments relating to the Showy Phlox project requiring his signature, 
including the finalized Conservation Easement Agreement. (Id., ~ 15) That same day the fully 
executed Conservation Easement was recorded by HTEH with Ada County as Instrument No. 
10614469. (R. pp. 534-543, Exhibit Y) By this transaction, the Easement was conveyed to the 
Land Trust as a charitable gift, exclusively for the conservation purposes as a perpetual 
limitation on the use and enjoyment of the property within the Showy Phlox Estates. (Id; R. pp. 
11-12, ~ 30) At the time the Conservation Easement was granted to the Land Trust, no 
instrument was prepared by the law firm or recorded subordinating the bank mortgage. (R. p. 12, 
~ 32; 501, ~~ 16 - 17) 
The Minnicks filed a joint tax return in 2006, claiming the conservation easement grant to 
the Land Trust as a charitable deduction, and then carried part of the deduction forward on their 
2007 and 2008 federal tax returns. In 2009, the IRS notified the Minnicks their 2006 return was 
selected for examination, indicating only that the audit would primarily focus on "Schedule A 
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Contributions Conservation Easement". (R. pp. 338, ~ 5; 344-346, Exh. E)4 Mr. Minnick and 
his accountant met with the IRS Examiner whose only issue of concern was the valuation of the 
easement, but were unable to resolve the matter. (ld. ~ 6) So, on June 1, 2009 Appellants 
engaged Tarter, an attorney with tax specialty, to represent them on "questions then being raised 
by the IRS" relating to the charitable donation for the Conservation Easement. (!d. ~ 4) 
Shortly thereafter, on July 8, 2009, the IRS issued notices of disallowance, commonly 
referred to as "30-day letters". (ld. ~ 7) Accompanying these letters was an Examiner's Report 
explaining the reason for recommending disallowance. (Id. ~ 8) The four reasons identified at 
that time are discussed and explained in detail herein below. But, sufficc it to say, they did not 
include failure to subordinate the U.S. Bank mortgagc and did not implicate a potential claim of 
malpractice against Respondents. 
On December 14, 2009, the Minnicks' tax counsel filed a Petition to the Tax Court 
challenging the disallowance notices and the reasons stated therein. (R. pp. 339, ~ 12; 379-381, 
Exh. I) Again, neither the Petition nor the Answer filed by the IRS involved subordination or any 
other issue which might implicate malpractice on the part of HTEH. (R. pp. 382-384) 
Not until June 10, 2010, did the IRS raise any question about whether there was a 
subordination agreement. (R. pp. 340, ~ 14-15; 385-386, Exh. K)5 Sometime thereafter, 
Appellants tax counsel learned from Wardle that no subordination agreement had been prepared 
or recorded by HTEH. (Id. ~ 16) With Wardle's assistance, a subordination agreement was 
finally prepared and signed by the bank, and on September 12, 2011, that agreement was 
recorded by HTEH. (Id. ~ 17) 
4 The only documents requested for the audit were the Purchase Contract and Appraisal Report. (R. p. 346) 
5 The IRS Appeals Officer wrote Tarter asking for a number of documents including "a copy of any and all 
subordination agreements." (R. p. 386, item 8) 
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On September 13, 2011, the IRS filed its Pre-Trial Memorandum with the Tax Court 
claiming for the first time that the subordination requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) 
had not been met. (Id.,-r 19) When trial began in the Tax Court on October 4, 2011, the IRS filed 
for leave to amend its answer to allow subordination as a new ground for disallowance.6 (Id.,-r 
20; 416-422, Exh. M) The Tax COUli granted the amendment after the trial on January 5, 2012, 
and set a briefing schedule for post-trial briefs on all issues. (R. p. 341, ,-r,-r 22-23; 435-436 Exh. 
0) 
However, on April 3, 2012, a decision was issued in another related Tax Court case, 
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 16 (2012). (Id.,-r 23; R. pp. 437-463 Exh. P) Until that 
decision, there was uncertainty about whether a defect on filing a subordination agreement could 
be corrected by recording the subordination after the claimed deduction, precisely what had 
happened in the Minnicks' situation. Mitchell ruled the subordination had to be filed before 
granting the conservation easement. (R. pp. 439-441 and 460, Exh. Pat 13-15 and 24) 
Anticipating that they might lose the Tax Court case because of the Mitchell decision, on 
June 7, 2012, Appellants filed their malpractice suit against Respondents. (R. p. 6) This was 
within two years of when the IRS first raised any question about a subordination agreement, and 
within five months of when the issue was added as a ground for disallowance in the Tax Court. 
(R. pp. 435-36, Exh. 0) Appellants withheld service of the Complaint, however, until December, 
2012, hoping that they might convince the Tax Court that their situation was distinguishable 
from Mitchell. 7 
Because of the Mitchell decision, the Tax Court issued a new scheduling order on July 
18, 2012, limiting post-trial arguments only to whether Appellants had satisfied the 
6 Tarter objected to the amendment as untimely. (R. pp. 340, ~ 21; 423-431; Exh. N) 
7 Service was accepted by Respondents' counsel on December 5, 2012. 
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subordination requirements of the regulations and whether they would be subject to penalties for 
failing to meet such requirements. (R. p. 341, ~ 24; 465, Exh. R) With this order, the controlling 
issue before the Tax Court became timely subordination. (Id. ~ 25) On December 17, 2012, the 
Tax Court issued its decision holding that "[b]ecause the U.S. Bank's mortgage was not 
subordinated to the conservation easement when it was granted, no deduction is permitted for the 
grant of the conservation easement". (R. pp. 341-42, ~ 26; 471 Exh. Sat 6) Given this ruling, the 
Tax Court stated that it "need not reach the IRS's alternative arguments for denying the 
deduction." (R. p. 476, Exh. S at 11) 
On January 22, 2013, the Minnicks filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Tax 
Court which was denied June 30, 2013. (R. pp. 342, ~ 27,487-505 Exhs. T & U) As of the time 
the Respondents and Appellants sought summary judgment in the malpractice suit, the Minnicks 
had until September 18,2013 to appeal the Tax Court decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. (Jd. ~ 29) By the time of oral argument, the District Court was advised that 
appeal had been timely filed. (Tr. P. 23, Lines 6-12) The trial court was also advised that the 
IRS had yet to issue any tax assessment to Appellants and, pursuant to 26 U.S.C., Section 6203, 
it was Tim Tarter's understanding no assessment would be issued until the adverse decision of 
the Tax Court becomes final8. (R. p. 342, ~ 28) 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented by their appeal. 
A. Whether Plaintiffs' legal malpractice suit accrued within two years of when it was 
filed on June 7, 2012, or is barred by I.C. § 5-219(4). 
828 U.S.C. § 6203 provides that no assessment will issue until the Tax Court decision becomes final. See f. n. 9, 
infra. 
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B. Whether any party in this action is entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.e. § 
12-120(3), at the District Court or on appeal. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Appellants' Malpractice Suit is Not Barred by Idaho Code, Section 5-219(4). 
Idaho Code, Section 5-219(4) declares that an action for professional malpractice accrues 
"as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of." From the foregoing 
discussion of the facts and the attached chronology, it is evident that the Respondents' negligent 
acts and omissions alleged by the Appellants occurred in 2006; most certainly when the 
Conservation Easement was reviewed, modified and finalized by Geoff Wardle, then executed 
by Walt Minnick and recorded by HTEH on September 7, 2006, without any subordination 
agreement. However, for almost three decades, it has been clear that the limitation of Section 5-
219(4) is not measured simply by when the negligent conduct occurred. Accrual also requires 
the existence of some actual damage, and that damage must be something that could be 
recovered in the malpractice action. Stated more succinctly, the action does not accrue until 
there is some damage that was proximately caused by the actionable malpractice. It is on this 
precise standard that the District Court erred. 
1. Applicable Legal Standards 
This Court has repeatedly held that before the action accrues and the two-year limitation 
period begins to run, tangible evidence of "some damage" to the plaintiff is required. A cause of 
action "cannot accrue until some damage has occurred." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 
656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009). See also Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 
960,963 (1994); Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984). The reason 
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for this rule is that "in order to recover under a theory of negligence, the plaintiff must prove 
actual damage." Stephens, supra. 
Until some damage occurs, a cause of action for professional 
malpractice does not accrue. Therefore, some damage is required 
because it would be nonsensical to hold that a cause of action is 
barred by the statute of limitations before that cause of action even 
accrues. 
Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396, 400 (2002) (Citations omitted). 
Further, it must be "objectively ascertainable damage." Id. 
[A]n action for professional malpractice shall be deemed to have 
accrued for the purposes of I.C. § 5-219(4) only when there is 
objective proof that would support the existence of some actual 
damage. 
Chicoine v. Bignal!, 122 Idaho 482, 487, 835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992). Simply being at increased 
risk for potential loss or damage is not sufficient. "This Court differentiates between actual 
damage and the potential for damage." Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, 154 Idaho 
21,25,293 P.3d 645 (2013) See also, Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingill, 140 Idaho 480, 483, 
95 P.3d 631,633 (2004) 
And, most importantly for the purpose of the instant action, the damage that triggers the 
running of the statute "must be damage that the client could recover from the professional in an 
action for malpractice." Buxton, supra, 146 Idaho at 659. It must be damage that resulted from 
the wrongful act or omission that forms the basis of the malpractice action. "For the cause of 
action to have accrued, the damage must have resulted from the act of malpractice ('the 
occurrence, act or omission complained of)." Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 147, 106 P.3d 
470,473 (2005). Id. Stated perhaps more directly, the statute of limitations does not begin until 
there is an act or omission of malpractice and actual damage proximately caused by that 
malpractice. The action does not accrue until the plaintifI "has a complete and present cause of 
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action, i.e. when he can file suit and obtain relief." McCabe v. Cravens, 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188 
P.3d 896 (2008) (applying federal law). 
2. Application of Legal Principles in Tax Cases. 
There are two Idaho decisions involving income tax related claims of professional 
malpractice of seemingly analogous import which were debated below and noted in the District 
Court's decision: Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985) and Elliott v. Parsons. 128 
Idaho 723, 918 P.2d 592 (1996). However, before discussing each case, we should be mindful 
of this Court's admonition in Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543, 808 P.2d 876,880 (1991): 
The determination of what constitutes 'damage' for the purpose of 
accrual of an action must be decided on the circumstances of each 
case. 
Streib and Elliott are only instructive insofar as they provide insight in determining when there is 
objectively ascertainable evidence the Appellants sustained actual damage proximately caused 
by the particular occurrence, act or omission of malpractice complained of: so as to be 
actionable. 
In the first of these cases, Streib, an accountant was charged with preparing flawed tax 
returns over the course of five years. The errors were discovered roughly two years after the last 
tax return and the accountant was sued for malpractice less than a year later. 109 Idaho at 174. 
The district court granted summary judgment to the accountant finding that the plaintiffs were 
damaged and the action accrued when the tax returns were filed because as of that date "the 
plaintiffs were obligated to pay the full taxes due." !d. at 175. However, reversing the trial 
court, this Court held that "no damage was suffered until the tax return was challenged and an 
assessment made by the Internal Revenue Service." Id at 178 
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While this may appear to set a bright line for the accrual of malpractice claims arising 
from erroneous tax returns, Streib did not elaborate on what this Court meant by an 
"assessment." The accountant in that case conceded the action was timely "if measured trom the 
time of assessment of interest and penalties." Id. at 174-75. Accordingly, the Streib Court never 
identified a date or defining event. 
More than a decade later, in another tax case, Elliott, this Court made note of this 
ambiguity from the Streib decision and clarified its intentions. 128 Idaho at 725. Elliott was a 
legal malpractice action alleging that the defendant-attorney was supposed to structure the sale of 
a family-owned farm equipment dealership so as to allow the seller to defer its tax liability until 
it actually received the installment purchase payments. 128 Idaho at 724. Years after the Elliotts 
filed their tax return, the IRS conducted an audit and concluded the transaction did not qualify. 
Id. The IRS then issued what is referred to as a "30-day letter" contending the Elliotts owed 
additional taxes and interest. Following an administrative process that did not resolve the matter, 
the IRS issued a notice of deficiency, or "90-day letter," which the Elliotts contested by 
instituting proceedings in the U.S. Tax Court. Id. Ultimately, before trial, the Elliotts settled 
with the IRS and, based on the settlement the IRS issued an assessment for a reduced tax 
liability. Id. Approximately five months later the attorney and his firm were sued, alleging they 
negligently structured the sales transaction. Id. 
The trial court dismissed the suit on statute of limitation grounds, concluding that the 
Elliotts suffered "some damage" when they received the 30-day letter. Id. at 725. But Justice 
Johnson, writing for the Supreme Court disagreed, explaining what was intended by the term 
"assessment," as used in Streib. 
[I]t is clear that it meant the point at which I.R.S. assesses an 
enforceable and collectible tax liability against the taxpayer, not 
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the mere initiation of the I.R.S. challenge as evidenced by the 30-
day and 90-day letters. The issuance of an assessment under 
I.R.C. § 6203 may corne soon after I.R.S. challenges a tax 
return as in Streib, or it may come at the conclusion of a 
lengthy administrative and legal process as in the present case. 
Until there has been an assessment of unpaid taxes against the 
taxpayer, I.R.S. has not inflicted 'some damage' against the 
taxpayer - at least not as the term was used by this court in Streib. 
(Emphasis added) 9 
Despite this clarification, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment on statute of limitation grounds, but on a different rational than the date of assessment. 
Instead, the Court focused upon when the Elliotts first incurred legal expenses, explaining: 
Streib does not resolve the present case, however, because 
the Elliotts suffered "some damage" before the issuance of the 
I.R.S. assessment when they retained new tax counsel to resolve 
their disputes with I.R.S. in February 1986. 
* * * 
[T]he Elliotts sustained "some damage" in the form of 
attorney fees - a monetary loss they would not have suffered but 
for Parsons's alleged malpractice - when they hired new tax 
lawyers in 1986 after receiving the 30 day letter from I.R.S. 
Therefore, we uphold the trial court's summary judgment in favor 
of Parsons, although based on a different rationale of when the 
Elliotts sustained "some damage" to commence the running of the 
two year statute of limitations contained in I.C. § 5-219(4). 
128 Idaho at 725. Without question, the instant action similar to Elliott in several respects. The 
Appellants were issued a 30-day letter and following an administrative review, they were issued 
a 90-day letter. Before they were issued an assessment, they retained tax counsel who 
challenged the IRS notice of deficiency by initiating an action before the U.S. Tax Court. 
9 Section 6203 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 6203) merely describes that an assessment is made by 
"recording the liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary (of Treasury) in accordance with the rules or 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary." Typically, the taxpayer is advised through issuance of a Form 4340 
Certificate of Assessments and Payments, which is prescriptive notice of a liability. Farr v. u.s., 926 F.Supp. 147, 
151-52 (D. Idaho 1996) However, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6213, "no assessment ofa deficiency in respect to any 
tax imposed ... and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun or prosecuted ... if a petition 
has been filed in the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final." And, 26 u.s.c. § 7481 
makes clear that no decision of the Tax Court shall become tinal until expiration of the time allowed for appeal, or, 
if appealed, when the decision is affirmed or the appeal dismissed. 
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However, as we discuss in greater detail below, the differences of the instant action are 
considerable and, we submit, dictate an opposite result here. 
3. Elliott v. Parsons is Not Controlling Here 
On cursory review, it may appear that Elliott IS controlling in the instant action. 
Certainly, the trial court was of that impression, concluding that the action accrued "as soon as 
the Plaintiffs retained subsequent counsel to address any problem with the easement or charitable 
deduction." (Emphasis added) (R. p. 725) But upon closer review this conclusion is an incorrect 
interpretation of Elliott and deviates materially from the "some damage" principle expressed in 
cases preceding and following Elliott. 
To begin with, there is a major factual distinction between Elliott and this action. In 
Elliott, tax counsel was retained "to resist Internal Revenue Service (IRS) claims stemming from 
their former lawyer's allegedly negligent structuring and draft of a transaction for the sale of 
their business." 128 Idaho at 724. This nexus between incurring legal fees for a purpose directly 
connected with the alleged malpractice was pivotal to the analysis and outcome in Elliott. See, 
128 Idaho at 725 ("the expenditure of legal fees to defend against an action filed because of an 
attorney's alleged malpractice constituted 'some damage"'). 
In contrast, the Appellants retained tax counsel initially to address a number of issues the 
IRS raised as reasons for disqualifying a charitable deduction, none of which implicated a 
potential claim of malpractice against Respondents. The reasons for disallowance articulated by 
the IRS which caused Appellants to retain tax counsel were very particular. In its 30-day letter 
on June 30, 2009, the IRS alleged that the charitable deduction failed (1) because it was a quid 
pro quo transaction with the Land Trust, (2) because it was not "exclusively for conservation 
purposes," (3) because there needed to be a written acknowledgment from the Land Trust that no 
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goods or services were provided in consideration for the gift,IO and (4) because the IRS contested 
the value of the donation ("the appraisal of the property used [a] Hawed valuation analysis"). (R. 
pp. 365-369; Exh. G.1 pp. 1.5 1.9) (See also R. pp. 338-339, ~~ 8 & 10) 
All of these allegations involved issues unrelated to Respondents' legal services. None 
gave rise to a claim of malpractice against Respondents. And, none were ever alleged as the 
basis of Appellants' suit. 
Not until almost a year later, on June 10, 2010, did the IRS make any inquiry about 
subordination. (R. p. 340, ~~ 14-15) In a facsimile to Appellants' tax attorney the IRS Appeals 
Officer inquired: "If the Property was encumbered as of the date of the donation, please provide 
a copy of any and all subordination agreements (including mortgages)." (Id., p. 385-86 Exh K 
item 8) Not until another sixteen months later, October 4, 2011, did the IRS seek to amend its 
Tax Court pleadings to add failure to subordinate as an alleged ground for denying the deduction. 
(R. pp. 340-41, ~~ 20 21,416-431, Exh. M and N) And this amendment was not granted until 
January 5, 2012, after the Tax Court trial. (R. p. 341, ~ 22, 435-36, Exh. 0) The filing of 
Appellants' Complaint on June 7, 2012 was within two years of all of these dates; less than two 
years after subordination became an articulated reason for disallowing the charitable deduction 
and an acute malpractice concern. 
If the expense of attorney fees to challenge IRS claims can trigger the running of the 
statute of limitations, as Elliott instructs, it can only do so if the expense is causally connected to 
an identifiable act or omission of malpractice. Incurring legal fees on unrelated tax issues would 
not be damages that "resulted from the act of malpractice." Conway, 141 Idaho at 147. Such 
fees would not be "damages the client could recover from the professional in an action for 
malpractice." Buxton, 146 Idaho at 659. Without "a complete and present cause of action," i.e., 
10 This acknowledgment existed and was subsequently provided to the IRS. (R. p. 339, ~~ 10-11) 
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a negligent act or omission and actual damage proximately caused by such negligence, McCabe, 
145 Idaho at 957, no action would accrue and the statute of limitations could not commence 
runmng. 
4. The District Court Misconstrued the Facts to Reach an Erroneous Result. 
The analysis of the trial court in granting summary judgment is simply stated in its 
decision. Because no express limitation was placed on the "scope of legal services offered, 
recommended or provided by the (law) firm," the District Court infers Appellants "expected the 
Defendants to structure the transaction so as to allow them to claim the easement as a charitable 
deduction," and then finds that the Respondents' "representation included any and all issues 
related to the recording of the easement and related charitable deduction." (R. p. 725) On this 
analysis the District Court reached the following conclusion 
Since (for the purpose of this motion) the scope of representation 
encompassed all tasks related to the charitable deduction, the 
statute of limitations began as soon as Plaintiffs retained new 
counsel to help them resolve the charitable deduction dispute with 
the IRS. 
(R. p. 726) While inventive, this reasoning defies logic and altogether dismisses conflicting 
evidence. 
The absence of express limitations is not conclusive proof that the scope of representation 
had no limitations dictated by the circumstances and reasonably understood by the parties. 
Appellants have never alleged nor reasonably implied that "the scope of representation 
encompassed all tasks related to the charitable deduction," without limitation. Moreover, the 
interpretation of "all tasks" to include the four specific reasons given for disallowance by the IRS 
in July 2009, which precipitated the hiring of tax counsel, is simply wrong. 
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Appellants have not claimed that HTEH was responsible for the IRS's characterization of 
the conservation easement as a quid pro quo transaction. And, the record clearly contradicts any 
misapprehension the trial court may have had that this issue was one of the "tasks" included in 
the scope of Respondents' representation. Of particular note, Respondents embraced the IRS's 
unadjudicated quid pro quo contention as an affirmative defense in response to the Appellants 
malpractice suit CR. p. 26, 8th Aff Def.). Appellants sought summary judgment on this purported 
defense. CR. pp. 298-307; 681-682) Although the trial court never ruled on that motion because 
it found the entire action untimely CR. p. 728), there is extensive briefing in the record 
demonstrating rather conclusively there was no quid pro quo consideration for the easement from 
the Land Trust. Nowhere in that briefing is it suggested the quid pro quo issue arose from 
Respondents' malpractice. 
The IRS contention that the appraisal of the property used a t1awed valuation analysis 
was also embraced as one of Respondents' affirmative defenses, contending this unadjudicated 
claim barred Respondents from any liability for damages. This defense was also the subject of 
Appellants' partial summary judgment motion. CR. pp. 298-307; 681-82) Any concern the IRS 
had on valuation did not give rise to a malpractice claim against Respondents and Appellants 
have never made such a claim. Indeed, as the trial court could have easily discerned below, the 
appraisal at issue in the tax court was handled completely by Appellants and an independent 
appraiser well after HTEH ceased providing legal services to Appellants. 
On the other two disallowance reasons initially given by the IRS, it is beyond 
comprehension how the trial court could believe these implicated Respondents' legal services. 
The IRS Examiner's contention that the easement was not "exclusively for conservation 
purposes" has to do with an interpretation of whether it preserves land in perpetuity for public 
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recreation, education, or scenIC enjoyment, protects fish, wildlife or plant habitat or is 
historically important. (R. pp. 355-57, Exh. G.l at 1-6 and 1.7) It has never been suggested that 
HTEH could alter the character of the affected real property to have avoided this debate with the 
IRS. And, the IRS contention that there was no contemporaneous written document from the 
Land Trust acknowledging that it gave no goods or services in consideration for the charitable 
gift, proved to be factually in error. (R. p. 358, at 1.8) This written acknowledgment existed, was 
subsequently provided to the IRS, and the IRS abandoned this as a reasons for disallowing the 
charitable deduction. (R. p. 339, ~ 11) 
The trial court knew and even acknowledged that "[t]he Affidavits of Geoffrey Wardle 
and Walter C. Minnick are in stark contrast regarding the scope of Defendants' representation." 
(R. p. 725) Nonetheless, it dismissed the idea that this created a material factual dispute through 
a rather interesting, but nonetheless disingenuous device. Observing that "the court must resolve 
this factual dispute in Plaintiffs favor" (R. p. 726), the District Court ignored the Respondents' 
conflicting evidence and proceeded to interpret the factual record decisively unfavorable to the 
Appellants. 
Selectively, the trial court quotes in part from answers to interrogatories adopted by Mr. 
Minnick (Jd., citing Exh. CC at 12-13) (See also, R. pp. 687-88; 696-97) and portions of the 
Complaint, representing that there were no express limitations on the scope of representation and 
HTEH never advised Appellants to seek advice on tax matters from other attorneys or skilled 
professionals outside the firm. Omitted from any mention by the District Court is the rest of the 
Appellants' interrogatory response, including the following: 
Minnick recalls having a distinct conversation with Defendant 
Wardle about his intent to grant the conservation easement to the 
LTTV. Mr. Wardle recommended that Minnick obtain a draft or 
form easement agreement trom the LTTV, which he did in October 
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or November 2005. In February 2006, Minnick provided Hawley 
Troxell an incomplete draft of a conservation easement with the 
L TTV and sought the assistance of Hawley Troxell on all legal 
issues relating to the conservation easement. From that point, if 
not before, Defendant Wardle assumed primary responsibility on 
behalf of Hawley Troxell for the production of a conservation 
easement that would meet Plaintiffs' needs and satisfy all 
applicable legal requirements. From February 22, 2006 through 
September 7, 2006, Defendant Wardle and other Hawley Troxell 
attorneys designated by the Defendants participated in numerous 
reviews and revisions of the conservation easement leading to the 
version presented to Minnick by Defendants for his signature. 
Then, upon Defendants' instruction, the conservation easement 
was recorded together with other related instruments on September 
7, 2006. At no time prior to or following the recording of the 
easement instrument did anyone associated with the Defendants 
inform either Plaintiff of any problems with the legal sufficiency of 
the conservation easement instrument or its recordation, as a 
charitable deduction or otherwise. 
(Id.) Similar allegations in the Complaint are also ignored in the District Court's decision. (See, 
R. pp. 11-12, ~~ 26, 31 - 33) 
The District Court also failed to consider or at least mention, the af1idavit of Tim Tarter, 
explaining the scope of his representation and the evolution of various reasons for disallowance 
advanced over time by the IRS. Mr. Tarter's affidavit deserves reading in full (See, R. pp. 337-
43), but certain undisputed statements should be given emphasis here. Mr. Tarter was initially 
"engaged by Walter C. Minnick to assist and represent him and his wife relating to questions 
then being raised by the IRS relating to a charitable deduction claimed on their 2006, 2007 and 
2008 federal tax returns for a Conservation Easement." (/d. ~ 4. Emphasis added) Tarter 
explains that the 30-day letter and the Examiner's Report which were the focus of his initial 
services raised only the four issues we have discussed at length above, none of which implicated 
malpractice. (/d., ~ 10) Prior to the June 10, 2010 facsimile from the IRS Appeals Officer, "no 
question or potential concern had been raised about a subordination agreement and none of the 
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communications from the IRS identified this as a reason for disallowance." (Id., ~~ 14 -15). On 
September 19, 2011, "for the first time in the litigation the IRS claimed the subordination 
requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A - 14(g)(2) had not been met" (Id., ~ 19). 
5. Not Until June 10, 2010, Did Appellants Incur Ascertainable and Recoverable 
Damages for Malpractice. 
On proper analysis of the facts and controlling standards from this Court, the question 
presented by Respondents' statute of limitations defense can be stated succinctly. When can it 
be said, with objectively ascertainable proof, that the Appellants incurred legal fees for the 
services of their tax attorney which resulted from an occurrence, act or omission of malpractice 
complained of and which Appellants could recover as damages from Respondents? 
According to Respondents' argument below, that date is when the Minnicks first retained 
Tim Tarter. The District Couli adopted this, concluding "the statute of limitations began as soon 
as Plaintiffs retained new counsel to help them resolve the charitable deduction dispute with the 
IRS." (R. p. 725) However, to affirm this holding, two questions must be answered: 
First, had Appellants sued Respondents the day they retained Tarter to address the four 
issues raised by the 30-day Letter and the IRS Examiner's Report, what would have been the 
factual basis of a cognizable claim for malpractice against Respondents? Second, what attorney 
fees incurred for Tatier's services would have been recoverable from Respondents, if failure to 
subordinate had never been raised by the IRS and had not become the controlling issue before 
the Tax Court? 
Unless these questions can be answered to show "a complete and present cause of 
action," as of when Tim Tatier was retained, the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
must be reversed. See, McCabe v. Cravens, supra. The Appellants' cause of action for 
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malpractice did not accrue prior to June 10, 2010, at the earliest. And, the filing of suit on June 
7,2012 was within the limitation ofLC. § 5-219(4). 
B. Respondents Are Not Entitled to an Attorney Fee Award Pursuant to Idaho 
Code, Section 12-120(3) 
Following the decision granting summary judgment, Respondents sought costs and 
attorney fees, which the District Court awarded them on December 30, 2013. On appeal, 
Appellants do not contest that Respondents were the prevailing party below, pursuant to Rules 
54(d)(I)(B) and 54(e)(1), LR.C.P. They also do not contest the award of $66.00 in costs as a 
matter of right, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(I)(E)(1), I.R.C.P., if the Respondents prevail on appeal. 
However, Appellants do contest the District Court's award of attorney fees to Respondents 
pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 12-120(3). 
Even though Appellants seek reversal of the grant of summary judgment, on remand the 
facts of this case warrant guidance from this Court on whether either party may be entitled to 
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). The question of whether attorney fees are awardable to the 
prevailing party on this appeal also requires this Court's attention. 
1. Applicable Legal Standards 
Idaho Code, Section 12-120(3) authorizes an award of "a reasonable attorney's fee to be 
set by the court" to the prevailing party "in any civil action to recover ... in any commercial 
transaction." The term "commercial transaction" is defined in pertinent part to include "all 
transactions except for personal ... purposes." 
Historically, this Court has held "that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and 
even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a 'commercial 
transaction,' attorney fees under 12-120(3) are not authorized." Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 
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415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991) See also, Rice v. Lister, 13 2 Idaho 897, 901, 980 P .2d 561, 565 (1999). 
In recent years, however, the categorical rule against awarding attorney fees under Section 12-
120(3) in t01i actions eroded with a series of cases. The standards which evolved from these 
cases are of controlling significance in the instant action. 
In Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368,109 P.3d 1104, 1111 (2005), 
involving alleged bank fraud, it was held the "commercial transaction" provision of 12-120(3) 
could support a fees award, under celiain circumstances. 
The critical test is whether the commercial transaction comprises 
the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be 
integral to the claim and constitute a basis on which the party 
is attempting to recover. (Emphasis added) 
Id., quoting Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 426,987 P.2d 1035, 1041 
(1999). In Rahas v. Ver Mott, 141 Idaho 412, 415, III P.3d 97 (2005) this Court described the 
legal standard as a two-part test, as follows: 
In determining if attorney fees are appropriate in a commercial 
transaction, this Court has adopted a two-part test. "First, the 
commercial transaction must be integral to the claim, and second, 
the commercial transaction must provide the actual basis for 
recovery." Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design 
Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 493,65 P.3d 509, 515 (2003). 
In Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594, 599 (2007), alleging 
fraud and breach of warranties, an identical standard was applied. 
The decision in City of McCall v. Buxton, supra, 146 Idaho at 660, specifically overruled 
Fuller v.. Wolters and other prior legal malpractice cases that denied fees under 12-120(3).11 
More recently in another legal malpractice case, Soignier v. Fletcher. 151 Idaho 322, 326, 256 
P.3d 730, 734 (2011), this Court explained that "in some instances, the prevailing party may be 
II Because the Court in Buxton vacated the judgment and remanded the case, it did not offer any opinion on whether 
attorney fees were ultimately awardable. 
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entitled to attorney fees under § 12-120(3) in an action for malpractice so long as a commercial 
transaction occurred between the prevailing party and the party from whom the party 
seeks fees." (Emphasis added) But, in that case the Court held it was error for the district cOUli 
to have awarded fees "because there was no commercial transaction between them (the parties)." 
Id. 
The necessity of a commercial transaction between the parties to the lawsuit which forms 
the basis of the claim has been emphasized in other non-legal malpractice cases, as well. See 
Printercraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 460-61, 283 P.3d 757, 
778-79 (2012) ("even if there are several commercial transactions that created the circumstances 
underlying the claims, none of those transactions are between the parties.") 
In deciding to award attorneys' fees in the instant action, the District Court placed 
principal reliance upon Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 293 P.3d 
645 (20l3). There, the plaintiff hired the defendant law firm to draft and enforce a real estate 
purchase agreement. When the deal went awry, the law firm was sued for allegedly mishandling 
the transaction, causing the plaintiff to lose his earnest money deposit. 154 Idaho at 23. 
Reynolds does not rescind or modifY the standards enunciated in prior case law. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies where "a 'commercial transaction' 
is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the 
party is attempting to recover," and "[t]hus, as long as a 
commercial transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the 
prevailing party may be entitled to attorney fees for claims that are 
fundamentally related to the commercial transaction yet sound in 
tort." (Citations omitted) 
(Jd.) Nonetheless, the District Court's interpretation of the decision discards the statutory 
requirement of a non-personal commercial transaction, see I.C. § 12-120(3), and the two-part test 
applied consistently by this Court for years. Instead, the trial court erroneously substituted a 
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fundamentally different test: "whether the legal representation was commercial in nature," 
irrespective of the absence of any commercial transaction which constitutes the basis of the 
malpractice action. (R. p. 787) 
2. There Was No "Commercial Transaction" Satisfying the Requirements of Idaho 
Code Section 12-120(3) 
In order to satisfy the requirements of I.e. § 12-120(3), consistent with the language of 
the statute and the standards of the case law, three things must be shown in this case. First, the 
transaction constituting the basis of the malpractice claim must be "commercial," as opposed to 
"transactions for personal ... purposes." I.e. § 12-120(3). Second, there must be some 
commercial transaction which "is integral to the (malpractice) claim, and constitutes the basis 
upon which the party (Appellants) is attempting to recover." See, Reynolds, 154 Idaho at 26; 
Soignier, 151 Idaho at 236; Blimka, 143 Idaho at 728; Rahas, 141 Idaho at 415; Lettunich, 141 
Idaho at 368. Third, the commercial transaction must have "occurred between the prevailing 
party (Respondents) and the party from whom the party seeks fees (Appellants)." Soignier v. 
Fletcher, 151 Idaho at 326. 
None of these three standards was satisfied in this case. To reach a conclusion awarding 
attorney fees to Respondents, the District Court either ignored or evaded these standards. 
a. No "commercial transaction" constitutes the basis of the malpractice suit. 
On Respondents' motion for attorney fees below, neither the Respondents nor the trial 
comi could identify any particular transaction of a commercial nature which was integral to and 
the basis of Appellants' malpractice claim. We defy Respondents to do so on this appeal. This 
is not a suit like Reynolds, emanating from the drafting and enforcement of a real estate purchase 
agreement. The legal services provided by Respondents were essentially of two kinds: assistance 
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in obtaining approval of a land use development plat from Ada County and assistance in drafting, 
executing and recording several easements, particularly a conservation easement from which 
Appellants sought tax benefits. In the litigation, the parties have vigorously disputed what 
advice or assistance the Respondents provided or agreed to provide on the tax implications of the 
conservation easement. But, as was noted to the trial court in opposing Respondents' fees 
request, the law firm's attorneys have repeatedly described their services as limited and narrowly 
defined. 
In the "Undisputed Facts" section of their memorandum in support of their summary 
judgment motion, Respondents have represented that 
Mr. Minnick contacted the Defendants from time to time with 
discrete projects and specific tasks and requests. (citation omitted) 
Mr. Minnick purposefully limited the scope of Defendants' 
involvement in these discrete tasks and often complained about the 
costs associated with their services. (citations omitted) 
(R. p. 33) Even after one of the law firm's partners purportedly warned "he could not perform an 
adequate review of the CC&R'S12 'on the cheap,'" the firm's attorney contends Mr. Minnick 
continued to hire them only on "discrete projects and specific tasks and requests, consistently 
limiting the scope of the attorneys (sic) work." (R. p. 34) 
In opposing Appellants' partial summary judgment request, the principal lawyers who 
attended to Appellants' legal needs filed affidavits, further delineating the non-transactional 
scope of their legal services. Attorney Ballard averred that HTEH assisted "with a host of 
project specific tasks" (R. p. 654, ~ 3), that Mr. Minnick would call "only when he needed and 
wanted legal assistance on a particular topic" (R. p. 655, ~ 7), that his "involvement dealt with 
real estate matters ... such as roadway and CCR issues" (R. p. 654, ~ 4) and that "Defendants' 
primary focus was to ensure that the Showy Phlox subdivision satisfied all local land use, zoning 
12 CC&Rs refers to Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions to the property being developed. 
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and entitlement requirements." (R. p. 655, ~ 6) Respondent Wardle was equally limiting 
regarding his services. He described himself as "a real estate lawyer" (R. p. 650, ~ 4). He 
described the circumstance as "project-specific tasks" with Mr. Minnick "defining the scope of 
work." (ld., ~~ 2 & 3) Being more specific, he testified, 
The services I provided in relation to the Showy Phlox subdivision 
related to ensuring the subdivision application satisfied the 
applicable local land use, zoning, and entitlement requirements 
defined by Ada County and the Ada County Highway District. 
The Conservation Easement was just one aspect of the subdivision 
entitlement process (ld. at, 4). 
This activity no more constitutes a commercial transaction than if the law firm had been 
negligent in obtaining a vendor license, zoning variance, roadway dedication or construction 
permit for Appellants. No doubt Appellants hoped that the approval of the Showy Phlox Estates 
would lead to the eventual sale of developed lots in the subdivision. But, there is a material 
difference between the pursuit of governmental approval of land use conditions as a necessary 
predicate to launching a hopeful enterprise, and actually participating in a commercial 
transaction within the meaning ofI.C. § 12-120(3). 
b. The Conservation Easement from which the malpractice suit arises was a 
personal gift unrelated to any commercial transaction. 
The essence of Appellants' malpractice claim, as we have discussed at length, above, on 
the statute of limitations issue, arises from Respondents' failure to ensure that a conservation 
easement, reviewed and modified by Respondent Wardle, was subordinated to the U.S. Bank 
loan on the Showy Phlox property. (See R. pp. 271-272) Specifically, this placed Appellants in 
breach of the warranty in Paragraph 11 of the Conservation Easement l3 and fundamentally 
13 The Conservation Easement prepared and recorded by Defendants provided in pertinent part "that there are no 
outstanding mortgages ... that have not been expressly subordinated to the Easement." (R. p. 540 Exh. Y, ~ II) 
29 
impaired their ability to obtain a charitable deduction under the applicable provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code. I4 
But, none of the legal serVices Respondents failed to provide on the Conservation 
Easement is "fundamentally related" to a commercial transaction or even a commercial purpose. 
I.C. § 12-120(3) expressly excludes transactions for personal purposes. This Conservation 
Easement was a gift from Appellant Walt Minnick personally to the Land Trust of the Treasure 
Valley without consideration. IS Its purpose was to secure a charitable tax deduction for the 
Minnick and his wife personally. It is this charitable deduction which is at the center of this 
lawsuit; nothing more. There are no facts which place this legal malpractice dispute within the 
standards of Section 12-120(3). 
c. The District Court modified the "commercial transaction" test to reach an 
erroneous result. 
In reaching its decision to award attorney fees to the Respondents, the District Court 
offered the following analysis. 
When read together, Soignier and Reynolds indicate that in 
determining whether there was a commercial transaction, the 
Court should look to the transaction between the parties, as 
opposed to any other transaction in which the Plaintiffs may 
have been involved. Applying the analysis set for in Reynolds, 
the Court finds that the Plaintiffs retained the Defendants for a 
commercial purpose: to help them develop raw land into 
residential lots for sale. While the Plaintiffs also wanted the 
Defendants to help them obtain a sizeable personal tax deduction, 
the Court finds that this task was part of the larger development-
related work. 
The Court does not find that this case is distinguishable 
from Reynolds on grounds that the Plaintiffs were not parties to a 
transaction to sell the property. The dispositive issue in this case 
14 See, 26 eFR Sec. 1.170A-14(g)(2). 
15 The Showy Phlox property was owned by Walt Minnick, but both he and his wife benefited from any charitable 
deduction on their joint income tax returns. 
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is whether the legal representation was commercial in nature. 
Reynolds indicates that legal representation is commercial in 
nature if both parties entered into the relationship to realize a 
commercial benefit. The Court finds that this test has been 
satisfied here. 
(R. p. 787) (Emphasis added) By this analysis, the District Court modified the "commercial 
transaction" standard in several respects to reach an erroneous result. 
In the first place, although the statutory language of Section 12-120(3) expressly requires 
a commercial transaction, the District Court broadens the standard to include any legal 
representation which may be characterized as "commercial in nature" or which has "a 
commercial purpose," irrespective of how remote and regardless of any identifiable 
"transacti on." 
Second, by focusing on "the transaction between the parties"- essentially between client 
and counsel and expressly disregarding "any other transaction in which the Plaintiffs may be 
involved," the District Court's analysis entirely eviscerates the two-part test atiiculated by the 
case law. Since 2005, in all the cases discussed above, this court has repeatedly asked "whether 
the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit." By way of explanation all 
of these cases have identified the same two-part test; "the commercial transaction must be 
integral to the claim and constitutes a basis on which the party is attempting to recover." 
The sole basis on which Appellants have sued and sought recovery against Respondents 
is a mishandled conservation easement; specifically, the failure to subordinate a mortgage to the 
easement in breach of the warranty language of the Conservation Easement and, ultimately, 
contrary to a federal tax regulation. This is the gravamen of Appellants' malpractice claim. By 
modifying the legal standard, the District Court ignores this and effectively evades any inquiry 
into (1) identifying a commercial transaction, (2) which is integral to Appellants' claim, and (3) 
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which constitutes a basis of recovery. Such a standard deviates from the language of I.e. § 12-
120(3) and is in conflict with the established case law. 
Ultimately, according to the District Court's opinion, the dispositive question is whether 
"both parties (Appellants and Respondents) entered into the (legal) relationship to realize a 
commercial benefit." (R. p. 787) "This test," according to the trial cOUli, "has been satisfied 
here:' (Id.) Nowhere in the case law is this overly simplistic test articulated. Moreover, it begs 
the question of what "commercial benefit" Appellants realized from Respondents' land use 
planning, easement and tax advice. There are no facts showing any tangible commercial 
transaction or any commercial benefit resulting from the attorney client relationship between 
HTEI-I and the Minnicks. 
C. Attorney Fees on Appeal Under Section 12-120(3) 
In so far as I.C. § 12-120(3) may provide for mandatory fees to a prevailing party at the 
trial court, this same statute governs any award of fees sought on appeal. Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. 
Paintball Sports, 999 P.2d, 134 Idaho 263 (2000). "When the appeal of an order on attorney fees 
concerns entitlement to them, not the amount of an award, the statute does apply." Eighteen 
Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 716, 721,117 P.3d 130 (2005), citing Daisy Mfg., 
supra. 
Below, the District Court noted that Appellants' Complaint alleges attorney fees under 
Section 12-120(3), and characterized this pleading as suggesting that Appellants "believed that a 
commercial transaction formed the basis of their claim for relief" (R. p. 787) This comment 
seems a bit disingenuous given the debatable disagreement on whether there was a "commercial 
transaction" and the case law holding that any fees award may be waived if not pled. See, City 
(~fChubbuckv. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,203,899 P.2d 411 (1993), r'hg denied. 
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If this Court vacates the summary judgment against Appellants and remands the action 
for further proceedings, as sought by this appeal, entitlement to attorney fees under Section 12-
120(3) still demands attention. If it is the opinion of this Court that the character of the action 
entitles the prevailing party to attorney fees under Section 12-120(3), then Appellants seek an 
award of attorney fees on appeal. At the very least, with this Court's guidance, such fees should 
be considered by the trial court following remand. See, Kulczyk v. Kehle, 108 Idaho 640, 643, 
701 P .2d 260 (1985), 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued here, and such further reasons as may appear in subsequent 
briefing and at oral argument, Appellants seek reversal of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment and remand of this case for consideration and ruling upon the remainder of Appellants' 
motion for partial summary judgment and other proceedings consistent with this Court's 
decision. 
FUlihermore, irrespective of whether this Court reverses or affirms the grant of summary 
judgment, Appellants seek rulings from this Court on whether any party (including Appellants) is 
entitled to an award of attorney fees in this action, pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3), at the trial court 
and/or on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this __ day of April, 2014 
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William L. Mauk, of the Firm 
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Chronology of Events 
Each of these events is documented in either the Complaint or in the Affidavits and Exhibits 
referenced here, which were filed in support of Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. Most of the 
Exhibits are attached to the Affidavit of Tim A. TaIier, Plaintiffs' counsel in the u.s. Tax Court. 
CR. pp. 337-343) 
Feb. Sept. 2006 
Sept. 7,2006 
Dec. 20, 2007 
2007 & 2008 
June 20, 2008 
June 1,2009 
July 8, 2009 
July 8, 2009 
Sept. 17, 2009 
Defendants engage in numerous modifications, drafts and 
finalization of Conservation Easement CR. pp. 500, ~ 12; 
580-583) 
Conservation Easement signed by Minnick and recorded 
by Respondents (R. pp. 534-543, Exh. Y) 
Minnicks file amended 2006 federal income tax return 
claiming Conservation Easement as charitable deduction 
(R. p. 12, ~ 35) 
Minnicks claim carryover portions of the charitable 
deduction on 2007 and 2008 federal income tax returns 
CR. p. 13, ~~ 36-37) 
IRS sends notice to Minnicks that their 2006 federal tax 
return was selected for examination CR. pp. 344-346, Exh. 
E) 
Minnicks engage tax attorney, Tim A. Tarter CR. p. 340, ~ 
14) 
IRS issues Notice of Disallowance of the charitable 
deduction C"30-Day Letter") for Minnicks' 2006 federal 
tax return (R. pp. 347-349, Exh. F) together with Schedule 
A Contributions Lead Sheet (R. pp. 350-358, Exh. F.l) 
IRS issues Notice of Disallowance of the charitable 
deduction ("30-Day Letter") for Minnicks' 2007 and 2008 
federal tax return (R pp. 359-360, Exh. G) together with 
Schedule A Contribution Carry Forward Lead Sheet (R. 
pp. 361-373, Exh. G.1) 
IRS issues a Notice of Deficiency ("90-Day Letter") to 
Minnicks for 2007 and 2008 federal tax returns (R. pp. 





Sept. 12, 2011 
Sept. 19, 2011 







Minnicks file Petition with U.S. Tax Court challenging 
IRS Notice of Dcticiency dated 9/17/09 CR. pp. 379-381, 
Exh. I) 
IRS tiles Answer to Minnicks' U.S. Tax Court Petition CR. 
pp. 382-384, Exh. J) 
IRS Appeals Officer submits questions to Minnicks' tax 
attorney requesting "a copy of any and all subordination 
agreements" (R. pp. 385-386, Exh. K) 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley (HTEH) confirms to 
Minnicks that no subordination agreement was prepared 
and recorded. (R. p. 340, ~ 16) 
Subordination Agreement from U.S. Bank prepared and 
recorded by HTEH 
IRS Pretrial Memorandum (R. pp. 387-415, Exh. L) 
IRS tiles Motion for Leave to File Amendment to Answer 
in U.S. Tax Court (R. pp. 416-422; Exh. M) 
U.S. Tax Court Trial (R. p. 340, ~ 18) 
Minnicks file Response to IRS Motion for Leave to File 
Amendment to Answer CR. pp. 423-434, Exh. N) 
Order from U.S. Tax Court granting IRS leave to tile 
amendment to their Answer (R. pp. 435-436, Exh. 0) 
U.S. Tax Court decision in Mitchell v. Commissioner, 138 
T.C. No. 16 (2012) holding subordination must occur prior 
to grant of conservation casement (R. pp. 437-463, Exh. 
P) 
U.S. Tax Court suspends post-trial briefing schedule CR. 
p. 464, Exh. Q) 
U.S. Tax Court limits post-trial briefing to (1) whether 
petitioners' conservation easement satisfies the 
subordination requirements of the applicable Treasury 
regulations, and (2) potential penalty assessments issues 
(R. p. 465, Exh. R) 
Dec. 17,2012 
Jan. 22,2013 
June 20, 2013 
U.S. Tax Court Memorandum Findings of Fact and 
Opinion holding Conservation Easement not deductible 
because Minnicks "failed to meet the subordination 
requirement." CR. pp. 466-486, Exh. S at 7) 
Minnicks file Motion to Vacate Decision and Motion for 
Reconsideration of Findings and Opinion in U.S. Tax 
Court (R. pp. 487-503, Exh. T) 
U.S. Tax Court Order denying Motion to Vacate and 
Motion for Reconsideration (R. pp. 504-505, Exh. U) 
